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Capitaine Haddock
A titre professionnel et personnel je m'intéresse quotidiennement depuis 8 ans à la stratégie, aux doctrines, et en général à la pensée militaire des USA
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samedi 21 mars 2009

A la découverte de l'Amiral James G. Stavridis, probable futur SACEUR

L'amiral (USN) James G. Stavridis vient d'être proposé par le SECDEF, M. Robert Gates pour occuper la fonction de commandant des forces U.S. en Europe (US EUCOM), poste qui va de pair avec celui de Commandant Suprême des Forces de l'Alliance Atlantique en Europe (SACEUR, pour Supreme Allied Commander EURope). A ce titre, à la tête du Commandement Allié « Opérations » (ACO pour Allied Command Operations), il sera l’un des deux commandants stratégiques de l’OTAN.
Si, jusqu'à présent, Jim Stavridis ne s'est pas prononcé sur sa vision de ses futures fonctions qu'il exercera au Grand quartier général des puissances alliées en Europe (SHAPE, pour Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe) , il est intéressant d'examiner l'homme et son œuvre, en particulier celle qu'il accomplit actuellement en tant que US Southern Commander (US SOUTHCOM), commandement unifié Interarmées aux responsabilités régionales similaires à celles d' US EUCOM et aux défis régionaux probablement aussi complexes que ceux que rencontrent les intérêts américains en Europe.

L'Homme


Floridien de 54 ans d’ascendance grecque, fils de Colonel des Marines, James G. Stavridis (« Jim » pour les intimes) est sorti de l’académie navale d’Annapolis en 1976. Affecté aux forces de surface, il s’est particulièrement fait remarquer pour son leadership au commandement de l’USS Barry (DDG 52), du Destroyer Squadron 21, et du Battle Group du CVN Enterprise pendant les opérations Enduring Freedom et Iraki Freedom. Dans ces différentes fonctions il a obtenu de nombreuses récompenses prestigieuses au sein de l'US Navy, telle la "Battenbeg Cup" ou le "John Paul Jones Award." Breveté du National War College en 1992, il détient un doctorat en relations Internationales de la Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy . L’ensemble de ses qualités l’a amené à des postes de responsabilités importants au sein de l'US Navy et du Pentagone, dont celui de « Senior Military Assistant » du Secrétaire à la Défense Donald Rumsfeld.

Il est probablement l'un des plus jeunes officiers généraux US à obtenir le grade suprême en temps de paix, en ayant reçu sa 4ème étoile d’"Admiral" à 51 ans, le 19 octobre 2006.

Outre ses qualités de leadership, Jim Stavridis a la plume facile et prolifique. Rédacteur ou co-rédacteur de nombreux ouvrages et articles, il a son propre blog. Il est en particulier l'auteur d'un ouvrage, « Destroyer Captain: Lessons of a first Command » qui est la bible en matière de leadership pour les commandants d'unités de l'US Navy. Son épouse Laura Hall Stavridis participe à son aventure littéraire puisqu'elle est l'auteur du « Navy Spouse's Guide ». Ils se sont connus en Grèce alors qu'il avait 8 ans, et elle 3, leurs pères étant en poste ensemble à l'ambassade des U.S.A. Il sont parents de deux jeunes filles, Christina et Julia.

Formé aux relations internationales, Jim Stavridis a une volonté de mieux connaitre ses partenaires et leurs cultures. Parlant Français et Portugais entre autres langues, il a aussi appris l’Espagnol en prenant son commandement à SOUTHCOM et l’a maitrisé parfaitement très rapidement. Il a établi une liste de livres et de films étrangers qu'il conseille aux membres de son état-major pour qu'ils se familiarisent aux divers aspects des cultures latino-américaines.

Adepte des sports de raquette, il aime aussi jouer au basket, malgré sa petite taille qu'il n'hésite pas à plaisanter en public.

Ceux qui le croisent s'accordent à dire que c'est une personnalité charismatique, facile d'accès et allant vers les autres, quelque soit leur grade ou leur nationalité, en usant d'une civilité hors du commun. "C'est un chef extrèmement positif " qui est prêt à écouter avant de prendre une décision, n'a pas d'idées préconçues et est doté d'un esprit pratique. Proche de ses hommes, il met en avant l'équipe plutôt que les individus, lui inclus. Les décisions prises sont consciencieusement pesées au regard des risques encourus, des bénéfices attendus et des coûts estimés.
Réaliste dans son examen de la vision des USA qu'ont les autres nations, il ne parait pas montrer de préférence pour un pays ou un autre.

Sa philosophie du commandement:

- Civilité: "Être aimable, Partager le crédit des résultats et garder le sens de l'humour."

- Confiance tranquille: " Être toujours calme et constant. Ne pas laisser l'égo se mettre en travers du progrès."

- Créativité: "Être une veilleuse. Toujours se demander comment puis-je faire mieux ceci?"

- Travail d'équipe et collaboration: "Travailler ensemble, personne n'est plus intelligent que l'ensemble du groupe pensant ensemble."

- Détermination: "Ne jamais, jamais, jamais abandonner."

- Honnêteté et intégrité: "Ne jamais transgresser la loi ou les règlements. Être inflexible pour dire la vérité."


La Pensée



S'il fallait résumer la pensée stratégique de l'amiral Stavridis, deux de ses expressions favorites la résumeraient assez bien: " Think out of the box" et "Smart Power".



- La seconde révolution dans les affaires militaires



l’amiral Stavridis est un adepte des nouvelles technologies, et en particulier celles de l'information. Dès le printemps 1997 dans un article dans le "Joint Force Quarterly", il s'est penché sur « révolution dans les affaires militaires » (RMA, pour Revolution in Military Affairs), faisant preuve d'une vue visionnaire des conflits asymétriques auxquels seraient confrontés les USA. Il évoque une seconde RMA qui serait la réaction à la première dans la course continue entre "le boulet et la cuirasse". Selon lui une grande partie des technologies utilisées pour la première RMA, qui a pour objectif militaire de remplacer la logique d'attrition de l'adversaire par sa paralysie et sa mise en état de choc, seront (on est en 1997) commercialisées pour des applications civiles . Elles seront facilement accessibles à faible coût à de nombreux compétiteurs. Néanmoins certaines capacités de la RMA, qui repose sur trois piliers que sont le système de systèmes, la domination de l'information et la guerre de l'information, resteront inabordables pour ces adversaires. Se développera alors la seconde RMA, utilisant d'autres méthodes pour contrer les outils qui ne pourront être acquis. Stavridis en donne une liste non exhaustive. Ainsi pour limiter l'effet des frappes de précision les objectifs seront durcis, enterrés, dispersés, multipliés. Pour lutter dans le domaine de la guerre de l'information l'adversaire utilisera des méthodes primitives, s'isolera, contre-attaquera. Les senseurs sophistiqués seront aveuglés, les cibles multipliées, dissimulées et dispersées dans un environnement peu atteignable (population civile). La moindre qualité des hommes et des équipements sera compensée par la quantité et l'effet de masse. Des technologies nouvelles et innovantes adaptées à ces modes d'action seront développées dans des domaines comme la biologie (armes, mais aussi drogues, stimulants et médicaments), les munitions rustiques (missiles de croisière, mines...), la chimie des matériaux (blindages..), ou les armes de destruction massive. A la guerre de manœuvre s'opposera la défense statique et la manœuvre réactive (pièges, embuscades très étendues..).



- Le « Smart Power » et l' « Inter Agency » appliqués à la stratégie régionale



Si, dans ses postes au Pentagone, Jim Stavridis a jugé de l'importance des technologies émergentes pour la transformation des forces armées, il exprime depuis qu'il est à SOUTHCOM que ces dernières ne sont pas la seule réponse aux défis régionaux qu'affronte les États-Unis. Ses vues sur la conduite des affaires militaires y sont très proches de celles exprimées par le Secrétaire Robert Gates. Adepte pratiquant du « Smart Power », il est un fervent promoteur d’une approche inter administrations et d’un lien étroit entre les affaires militaires et la Diplomatie dans les politiques régionales.

L' amiral Stavridis part du principe que votre adversaire est au moins aussi intelligent que vous et très innovant. Pour appliquer à son encontre une stratégie gagnante, le « Smart Power », ne doit pas reposer sur la force pure. Il doit conjuguer une compréhension de la région non seulement au plan géopolitique, mais aussi culturel, social et humain, avec un esprit d'innovation tirant parti de tous les outils de puissance de la nation, mis en synergie par une organisation de type inter administrations (Inter Agency), de ses alliances et relations internationales, et même de partenariats avec le secteur privé.

Cette stratégie, de type « gagnant-gagnant », doit pouvoir être bénéfique à l'ensemble de la région. Elle doit mettre en avant la nécessité de renforcer et soutenir les partenariats internationaux sur le long terme, bâtissant la confiance et la coopération, pour garantir la sécurité d'états stables et le désir de répondre ensemble aux crises.

Pour y parvenir l'amiral Stavridis a complètement transformé l’organisation de SOUTHCOM pour passer son état-major d'une culture de combat à une culture « Inter Agency » et Internationale, ayant maintenant un diplomate comme un de ses deux « Deputy », renforcé la place et le nombre d'officiers de liaison étrangers, intégré d'autres agences fédérales ne dépendant pas du Department of Defense (DoD), développé la communication stratégique et les actions de coopération militaire internationale à but pacifique ( déploiement de navire hôpital, croisières d'instruction etc.), et soutenu activement la lutte contre la menace criminelle régionale au travers de la « Joint Inter Agency Task Force South » (JIATF-S), qu'il voit comme un modèle d'organisation « Inter Agency » et Internationale .

jeudi 6 décembre 2007

"Hard Power" + "Soft Power" = "Smart Power"

L'article qui suit complète la reflexion de Robert Gates présentée dans le billet précédent.
Les auteurs sont deux personnages influents de la pensée politique étrangère et stratégique américaine représentant les deux camps, républicain et démocrate.
Le premier, Richard L. Armitage a été sous-secrétaire du Département d'Etat sous Colin Powell. Le second Joseph S. Nyles Jr. a été un des premiers théoriciens du "Soft Power" et a occupé des fonctions de sous-secrétaire aux Départements d'Etat et de la Défense sous les administrations Carter et Clinton.
Maintenant ils dirigent conjointement une commission sur le "Smart Power" (Pouvoir Intelligent) au "Center for Strategic and International Studies".
Le "Smart Power" est une combinaison de "Hard Power", par nature coercitif, et de"Soft Power" atractif, destiné non pas à rendre le Monde semblable aux USA, mais à contrer les durs défis que ce pays aura à faire face.
Pour le bâtir, il faut revigorer les alliances , partenariats et institutions existantes .
C.H.
.
Why So Angry, America?
The United States is strongest when it is most engaged with the world.

By Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye Jr.
Washington Post - Sunday, December 9, 2007;

The world is dissatisfied with American leadership. Shocked and frightened after 9/11, we put forward an angry face to the globe, not one that reflected the more traditional American values of hope and optimism, tolerance and opportunity.
This fearful approach has hurt the United States' ability to bring allies to its cause, but it is not too late to change. The nation should embrace a smarter strategy that blends our hard and soft power -- our ability to attract and persuade, as well as our ability to use economic and military might. Whether it is ending the crisis in Pakistan, winning the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, deterring Iran and North Korea's nuclear ambitions, managing China's rise or improving the lives of those left behind by globalization, the United States needs a broader, more balanced approach.
Lest anyone think this approach is weak or naive, remember that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates used a major speech on Nov. 26 "to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use 'soft' power and for better integrating it with 'hard' power." We -- one Republican, one Democrat -- have devoted our lives to promoting American preeminence as a force for good in the world. But the United States cannot stay on top without strong and willing allies and partners. Over the past six years, too many people have confused sharing the burden with relinquishing power. In fact, when we let others help, we are extending U.S. influence, not diminishing it.
Since 9/11, the war on terrorism has shaped this isolating outlook, becoming the central focus of U.S. engagement with the world. The threat from terrorists with global reach is likely to be with us for decades. But unless they have weapons of mass destruction, groups such as al-Qaeda pose no existential threat to the United States -- unlike our old foes Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.
In fact, al-Qaeda and its ilk hope to defeat us by using our own strength against us. They hope we will blunder, overreact and turn world opinion against us. This is a deliberately set trap, and one whose grave strategic consequences extend far beyond the costs that this nation would suffer from any small-scale terrorist attack, no matter how individually tragic and collectively painful. We cannot return to a nearsighted pre-9/11 mindset that underestimated the al-Qaeda threat, but neither can we remain stuck in a narrow post-9/11 mindset that alienates much of the world.
More broadly, when our words do not match our actions, we demean our character and moral standing. We cannot lecture others about democracy while we back dictators. We cannot denounce torture and waterboarding in other countries and condone it at home. We cannot allow Cuba's Guantanamo Bay or Iraq's Abu Ghraib to become the symbols of American power.
The United States has long been the big kid on the block, and it will probably remain so for years to come. But its staying power has a great deal to do with whether it is perceived as a bully or a friend. States and non-state actors can better address today's challenges when they can draw in allies; those who alienate potential friends stand at greater risk.
The past six years have demonstrated that hard power alone cannot secure the nation's long-term goals. The U.S. military remains the best in the world, even after having been worn down from years of war. We will have to invest in people and materiel to maintain current levels of readiness; as a percentage of gross domestic product, U.S. defense spending is actually well below Cold War levels. But an extra dollar spent on hard power will not necessarily bring an extra dollar's worth of security.
After all, security threats are no longer simply military threats. China is building two coal-fired power plants each week. U.S. hard power will do little to curb this trend, but U.S.-developed technology can make Chinese coal cleaner, which helps the environment and opens new markets for American industry.
In a changing world, the United States should become a smarter power by once again investing in the global good -- by providing things that people and governments want but cannot attain without U.S. leadership. By complementing U.S. military and economic strength with greater investments in soft power, Washington can build the framework to tackle tough global challenges. We call this "smart power."
Smart power is not about getting the world to like us. It is about developing a strategy that balances our hard (coercive) power with our soft (attractive) power. During the Cold War, the United States deterred Soviet aggression through investments in hard power. But as Gates noted late last month, U.S. leaders also realized that "the nature of the conflict required us to develop key capabilities and institutions -- many of them non-military." So the United States used its soft power to rebuild Europe and Japan and to establish the norms and institutions that became the core of the international order for the past half-century. The Cold War ended under a barrage of hammers on the Berlin Wall rather than a barrage of artillery across the Fulda Gap precisely because of this integrated approach.
Specifically, the United States should renew its focus on five critical areas:
-- We should reinvigorate the alliances, partnerships and institutions that allow us to address numerous hazards at once without having to build a consensus from scratch to respond to every new challenge.
-- We should create a Cabinet-level voice for global development to help Washington develop a more unified and integrated aid program that aligns U.S. interests with the aspirations of people worldwide, starting with global health.
-- We should reinvest in public diplomacy within the government and establish a new nonprofit institution outside of it to build people-to-people ties, including doubling the annual appropriation to the Fulbright program.
-- We should sustain our engagement with the global economy by negotiating a "free trade core" of countries in the World Trade Organization willing to move directly to free trade on a global basis, and expand the benefits of free trade to include those left behind at home and abroad.
-- We should take the lead in addressing climate change and energy insecurity by investing more in technology and innovation.
Leadership requires more than vision. It requires execution and accountability, two features in short supply in government today.
Throughout the Cold War, the United States projected an image of vast technical competence: We sent humans to the moon and helped eradicate smallpox. Later, the nation's military victories in Iraq in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999 demonstrated its towering technical proficiency. But today, the United States projects a very different image. The country's tragically inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina, difficulty in restoring basic services in Iraq and inability to address looming domestic issues such as health care, immigration and the cost of entitlements have made it appear that the country can no longer solve tough problems. Some people abroad have always questioned U.S. policy. Today, many are questioning our basic competence.
Smart power could start to change that, but it will not solve all of the nation's problems. Its lasting value is that it may help persuade others to join the U.S. cause. Do not underestimate the importance of having Iran finally hear in stereophonic sound that it must desist from pursuing a nuclear weapons program; given the latest National Intelligence Estimate, it might have actually worked. And do not underestimate the goodwill that a sustained effort to eradicate disease could bring.
Consider the current crisis in Pakistan. The United States might be in a better position today had it not walked away from Pakistan in the 1990s and had it broadened its engagement beyond military cooperation with and support of Gen. Pervez Musharraf over the past six years, as the 9/11 commission suggested. Instead, U.S. favorability ratings are below 20 percent in Pakistan. The U.S.-led war on terrorism is widely seen by Pakistanis as a war on Islam, and American support now tarnishes Pakistani leaders who share U.S. objectives.
And yet, for a brief period in late 2005 and early 2006, U.S. favorability ratings approached 50 percent in Pakistan. Why? Because of the U.S. military's effective and principled response to the October 2005 earthquake there, the largest and longest relief effort in U.S. military history. It showed Pakistanis U.S. commitment and friendship and provided an important source of smart power. It demonstrated, however briefly, that America's standing in the world can indeed be restored.
Now, a year before the presidential elections, candidates from both parties can present a more optimistic vision that balances Americans' desire for protection at home with wiser policies abroad. It would simply be the smart thing to do.
smartpower@csis.org

mercredi 28 novembre 2007

La vision du Secrétaire d'Etat à la Défense, Robert M. Gates

Ce ne sont pas les sujets à aborder qui me manquent pour ce blog. Aujourd’hui je rattrape presque l’actualité puisque je vais consacrer ce billet au discours prononcé le 26 novembre par le Secrétaire d’Etat américain à la Défense (SECDEF), Robert M. Gates.

Ce texte, donné à la Kansas State University, fait partie de la série des « Landon Lectures » invitant des conférenciers renommés, dont de nombreux chefs d’Etat.

Ce discours de géopolitique sera probablement considéré comme une référence pour le développement de la stratégie de défense américaine dans les années à venir. Il conditionnera vraissemblablement l’évolution de du Département de la Défense et de l’appareil militaire américain, mais aussi les autres outils de puissance internationale des USA, au premier rang desquels le Département d’Etat. L'analyse que fait le SECDEF le conduit aussi à faire des choix entre les positions exprimées dans débat en cours à propos du futur des forces armées américaines et devrait orienter la prochaine « Quadriennal Defense Review » (QDR).

Ce que je veux en retenir :

Les très nombreuses analyses historiques de Robert Gates qui occupent une bonne partie du discours sont très intéressantes et pertinentes. Mais il faut surtout s'attacher à sa vision des défis actuels et futurs des Etats-Unis en tant que puissance mondiale, la manière dont elle doit les aborder en utilisant la totalité des instruments de Pouvoir dont dispose la Nation, par ce qu’elle va sans nul doute conditionner la politique américaine.

Selon le SECDEF, la fin de la guerre froide et les attaques du 11 septembre on marqué l’aube d’une nouvelle ère dans les relations internationales, une ère dont les défis sont peut-être sans précédent en complexité et en portée.

En plus des maux traditionnels qui existaient à la fin du XIXème et au début du XXème siècle, tels, les conflits portés par la haine religieuse ou ethnique , les mouvements révolutionnaires et même le terrorisme, qui avaient été occultés depuis la I ère Guerre Mondiale jusqu’à la fin de la Guerre Froide, s’ajoutent de nouvelles forces d’instabilité et de conflit. Ce sont entre autres :

- Une nouvelle forme, plus maligne de terrorisme mondial prenant ses racines dans un jihadisme extrémiste et violent ;

- De nouvelles manifestations de conflits ethniques, tribal et sectaire de part le Monde ;

- La prolifération des armes de destruction massive ;

- Les Etats affaiblis ou en faillite ;

- Les états enrichis par la manne pétrolière et mécontents de l’ordre mondial actuel ;

- Et les forces centrifuges qui menacent dans d’autres pays l’unité nationale, la stabilité et la paix interne, mais aussi ayant une influence sur la sécurité régionale et mondiale.

Il ajoute à cela les régimes autoritaires qui voient leur peuple demander plus de liberté politique et de meilleures conditions de vie, ainsi que les grandes puissances émergentes, ou résurgentes, dont le futur cheminement est encore incertain.

Circonscrire ces maux et ces menaces ne peut pas se faire par le seul usage de la force militaire, le « Hard Power ». Il faut renforcer les autres éléments importants de la puissance nationale, institutionnels et financiers, le « Soft Power », et créer la capacité d’intégrer et d’appliquer tous ces instruments de Pouvoir de la Nation aux défis rencontrés à l’extérieur.

Au vu des défis rencontrés depuis la fin de la Guerre Froide, Robert Gates pense qu’il faut changer les priorités de l’appareil de Défense US pour être capable de mieux traiter les « Guerres asymétriques » qui vont prévaloir encore pour un certain temps. En effet, il lui parait difficilement concevable qu’un pays défie militairement les USA de manière frontale dans les quelques années à venir. Au contraire l’histoire montre que des forces irrégulières, insurgés, guérilla ou terroristes, ont réussi à frustrer des armées régulières importantes et semer le chaos.

Ces conflits asymétriques sont fondamentalement politiques par nature et requièrent l’usage de l’ensemble des pouvoirs de la Nation. Le succès ne dépend pas de la capacité à imposer sa propre volonté, mais de celle de modeler le comportement des amis et des ennemis, et plus important encore des populations qui sont entre les deux.

Ces nouvelles menaces imposent que le gouvernement dans son ensemble agisse différemment : avec unité, agilité et créativité. Elles requièrent aussi des ressources bien plus considérables pour les instruments de pouvoir non-militaires des USA.

A ce titre, il souhaite voir augmenter de manière conséquente les ressources budgétaires et humaines du Département d’Etat.

De même les capacités de reconstruction que les armées ont développé en Afghanistan et en Irak doivent être maintenues et institutionnalisées. Le travail en « inter-agences » ou avec des organisations extérieures au gouvernement doit être développé et mieux intégré.

Le SECDEF veut aussi développer la communication stratégique vers le reste du Monde pour promouvoir l’image des USA et de ses valeurs fondamentales.

Tout cela nécessite des fonds et il ne faut pas les concentrer sur les seuls moyens militaires matériels et humains. Avec une diplomatie plus forte l’appareil militaire est moins sollicité.

Il cite enfin l’historien Donald Kagan, estimant que ce qui est le meilleur pour les affaires « c’est la possession par ces Etats qui veulent préserver la Paix du pouvoir prépondérant et de la volonté d’accepter les charges et les responsabilités que requises pour pour parvenir à cette fin », faisant ensuite sienne cette déclaration de W . Churchill: « Le prix de la grandeur, c’est la responsabilité, ... Le peuple américain ne peux pas échapper à ses responsabilités mondiales ».

C.H.

Voici l’extrait significatif de ce discours :

LANDON LECTURE

Robert M. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense

Kansas State University – November 26th, 2007

Looking around the world today, optimism and idealism would not seem to have much of a place at the table. There is no shortage of anxiety about where our nation is headed and what its role will be in the 21st century.

I can remember clearly other times in my life when such dark sentiments were prevalent. In 1957, when I was at Wichita High School East, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, and Americans feared being left behind in the space race and, even more worrisome, the missile race.

In1968, the first full year I lived in Washington, was the same year as the Tet offensive in Vietnam, where American troop levels and casualties were at their height. Across the nation, protests and violence over Vietnam engulfed America’s cities and campuses. On my second day of work as a CIA analyst, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. And then came the 1970s – when it seemed that everything that could go wrong for America did.

Yet, through it all, there was another storyline, one not then apparent. During those same years, the elements were in place and forces were at work that would eventually lead to victory in the Cold War – a victory achieved not by any one party or any single president, but by a series of decisions, choices, and institutions that bridged decades, generations, and administrations. From:

· The first brave stand taken by Harry Truman with the doctrine of containment; to

· The Helsinki Accords under Gerald Ford; to

· The elevation of human rights under Jimmy Carter; to

· The muscular words and deeds of Ronald Reagan; and to

· The masterful endgame diplomacy of George H. W. Bush.

All contributed to bring an Evil Empire crashing down not with a bang but with a whimper. And virtually without a shot being fired.

In this great effort, institutions, as much as people and policies, played a key role. Many of those key organizations were created 60 years ago this year with the National Security Act of 1947 – a single act of legislation which established the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the United States Air Force, and what is now known as the Department of Defense. I mention all this because that legislation and those instruments of national power were designed at the dawn of a new era in international relations for the United States – an era dominated by the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War, and the attacks of September 11, marked the dawn of another new era in international relations – an era whose challenges may be unprecedented in complexity and scope.

In important respects, the great struggles of the 20th century – World War I and World War II and the Cold War – covered over conflicts that had boiled and seethed and provoked wars and instability for centuries before 1914: ethnic strife, religious wars, independence movements, and, especially in the last quarter of the 19th century, terrorism. The First World War was, itself, sparked by a terrorist assassination motivated by an ethnic group seeking independence.

These old hatreds and conflicts were buried alive during and after the Great War. But, like monsters in science fiction, they have returned from the grave to threaten peace and stability around the world. Think of the slaughter in the Balkans as Yugoslavia broke up in the 1990s. Even now, we worry about the implications of Kosovo’s independence in the next few weeks for Europe, Serbia, and Russia. That cast of characters sounds disturbingly familiar even at a century’s remove.

The long years of religious warfare in Europe between Protestant and Catholic Christians find eerie contemporary echoes in the growing Sunni versus Shia contest for Islamic hearts and minds in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asia.

We also have forgotten that between Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy, two American presidents and one presidential candidate were assassinated or attacked by terrorists – as were various tsars, empresses, princes, and, on a fateful day in June 1914, an archduke. Other acts of terrorism were commonplace in Europe and Russia in the latter part of the 19th century.

So, history was not dead at the end of the Cold War. Instead, it was reawakening with a vengeance. And, the revived monsters of the past have returned far stronger and more dangerous than before because of modern technology – both for communication and for destruction – and to a world that is far more closely connected and interdependent than the world of 1914.

Unfortunately, the dangers and challenges of old have been joined by new forces of instability and conflict, among them:

· A new and more malignant form of global terrorism rooted in extremist and violent jihadism;

· New manifestations of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian conflict all over the world;

· The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

· Failed and failing states;

· States enriched with oil profits and discontented with the current international order; and

· Centrifugal forces in other countries that threaten national unity, stability, and internal peace – but also with implications for regional and global security.

Worldwide, there are authoritarian regimes facing increasingly restive populations seeking political freedom as well as a better standard of living. And finally, we see both emergent and resurgent great powers whose future path is still unclear.

One of my favorite lines is that experience is the ability to recognize a mistake when you make it again. Four times in the last century the United States has come to the end of a war, concluded that the nature of man and the world had changed for the better, and turned inward, unilaterally disarming and dismantling institutions important to our national security – in the process, giving ourselves a so-called “peace” dividend. Four times we chose to forget history.

Isaac Barrow once wrote, “How like a paradise the world would be, flourishing in joy and rest, if men would cheerfully conspire in affection and helpfully contribute to each other’s content: and how like a savage wilderness now it is, when, like wild beasts, they vex and persecute, worry and devour each other.” He wrote that in the late 1600s. Or, listen to the words of Sir William Stephenson, author of A Man Called Intrepid and a key figure in the Allied victory in World War II. He wrote, “Perhaps a day will dawn when tyrants can no longer threaten the liberty of any people, when the function of all nations, however varied their ideologies, will be to enhance life, not to control it. If such a condition is possible it is in a future too far distant to foresee.”

After September 11th, the United States re-armed and again strengthened our intelligence capabilities. It will be critically important to sustain those capabilities in the future – it will be important not to make the same mistake a fifth time.

But, my message today is not about the defense budget or military power. My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former Director of CIA and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use “soft” power and for better integrating it with “hard” power.

One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more – these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success. Accomplishing all of these tasks will be necessary to meet the diverse challenges I have described.

So, we must urgently devote time, energy, and thought to how we better organize ourselves to meet the international challenges of the present and the future – the world you students will inherit and lead.

I spoke a few moments ago about the landmark National Security Act of 1947 and the institutions created to fight the Cold War. In light of the challenges I have just discussed, I would like to pose a question: if there were to be a “National Security Act of 2007,” looking beyond the crush of day-to-day headlines, what problems must it address, what capabilities ought it create or improve, where should it lead our government as we look to the future? What new institutions do we need for this post Cold War world?

As an old Cold Warrior with a doctorate in history, I hope you’ll indulge me as I take a step back in time. Because context is important, as many of the goals, successes, and failures from the Cold War are instructive in considering how we might better focus energies and resources – especially the ways in which our nation can influence the rest of the world to help protect our security and advance our interests and values.

What we consider today the key elements and instruments of national power trace their beginnings to the mid-1940s, to a time when the government was digesting lessons learned during World War II. Looking back, people often forget that the war effort – though victorious – was hampered and hamstrung by divisions and dysfunction. Franklin Roosevelt quipped that trying to get the Navy, which was its own cabinet department at the time, to change was akin to hitting a featherbed: “You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted,” he said, “and then you find the damn bed just as it was before.” And Harry Truman noted that if the Navy and Army had fought as hard against the Germans as they had fought against each other, the war would have been over much sooner.

This record drove the thinking behind the 1947 National Security Act, which attempted to fix the systemic failures that had plagued the government and military during World War II – while reviving capabilities and setting the stage for a struggle against the Soviet Union that seemed more inevitable each passing day.

The 1947 Act acknowledged that we had been over-zealous in our desire to shut down capabilities that had been so valuable during the war – most of America’s intelligence and information assets disappeared as soon as the guns fell silent. The Office of Strategic Services – the war intelligence agency – was axed, as was the Office of War Information. In 1947, OSS returned as CIA, but it would be years before we restored our communications capabilities by creating the United States Information Agency.

There is in many quarters the tendency to see that period as the pinnacle of wise governance and savvy statecraft. As I wrote a number of years ago, “Looking back, it all seem[ed] so easy, so painless, so inevitable.” It was anything but.

Consider that the creation of the National Military Establishment in 1947 – the Department of Defense – was meant to promote unity among the military services. It didn’t. A mere two years later the Congress had to pass another law because the Joint Chiefs of Staff were anything but joint. And there was no chairman to referee the constant disputes.

At the beginning, the Secretary of Defense had little real power – despite an exalted title. The law forbad him from having a military staff and limited him to three civilian assistants. These days, it takes that many to sort my mail.

Throughout the long, twilight struggle of the Cold War, the various parts of the government did not communicate or coordinate very well with each other. There were military, intelligence, and diplomatic failures in Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Grenada, and many other places. Getting the military services to work together was a recurring battle that had to be addressed time and again, and was only really resolved by legislation in 1986.

But despite the problems, we realized, as we had during World War II, that the nature of the conflict required us to develop key capabilities and institutions – many of them non-military. The Marshall Plan and later the United States Agency for International Development acknowledged the role of economics in the world; the CIA the role of intelligence; and the United States Information Agency the fact that the conflict would play out as much in hearts and minds as it would on any battlefield.

The key, over time, was to devote the necessary resources – people and money – and get enough things right while maintaining the ability to recover from mistakes along the way. Ultimately, our endurance paid off and the Soviet Union crumbled, and the decades-long Cold War ended.

However, during the 1990s, with the complicity of both the Congress and the White House, key instruments of America’s national power once again were allowed to wither or were abandoned. Most people are familiar with cutbacks in the military and intelligence – including sweeping reductions in manpower, nearly 40 percent in the active army, 30 percent in CIA’s clandestine services.

What is not as well-known, and arguably even more shortsighted, was the gutting of America’s ability to engage, assist, and communicate with other parts of the world – the “soft power,” which had been so important throughout the Cold War. The State Department froze the hiring of new Foreign Service officers for a period of time. The United States Agency for International Development saw deep staff cuts – its permanent staff dropping from a high of 15,000 during Vietnam to about 3,000 in the 1990s. And the U.S. Information Agency was abolished as an independent entity, split into pieces, and many of its capabilities folded into a small corner of the State Department.

Even as we throttled back, the world became more unstable, turbulent, and unpredictable than during the Cold War years. And then came the attacks of September 11, 2001, one of those rare life-changing dates, a shock so great that it appears to have shifted the tectonic plates of history. That day abruptly ended the false peace of the 1990s as well as our “holiday from history.”

As is often the case after such momentous events, it has taken some years for the contour lines of the international arena to become clear. What we do know is that the threats and challenges we will face abroad in the first decades of the 21st century will extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency.

The real challenges we have seen emerge since the end of the Cold War – from Somalia to the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere – make clear we in defense need to change our priorities to be better able to deal with the prevalence of what is called “asymmetric warfare.” As I told an Army gathering last month, it is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States directly in conventional military terms – at least for some years to come. Indeed, history shows us that smaller, irregular forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists – have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos.

We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior – of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.

Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police – once the province of Special Forces – is now a key mission for the military as a whole.

But these new threats also require our government to operate as a whole differently – to act with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to America’s non-military instruments of power.

So, what are the capabilities, institutions, and priorities our nation must collectively address – through both the executive and legislative branches, as well as the people they serve?

I would like to start with an observation. Governments of all stripes seem to have great difficulty summoning the will – and the resources – to deal even with threats that are obvious and likely inevitable, much less threats that are more complex or over the horizon. There is, however, no inherent flaw in human nature or democratic government that keeps us from preparing for potential challenges and dangers by taking far-sighted actions with long-term benefits. As individuals, we do it all the time. The Congress did it in 1947. As a nation, today, as in 1947, the key is wise and focused bipartisan leadership – and political will.

I mentioned a moment ago that one of the most important lessons from our experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has been the decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any meaningful, long-term success.

The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past, although new resources have permitted the State Department to begin taking on a larger role in recent months. Still, forced by circumstances, our brave men and women in uniform have stepped up to the task, with field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils – usually in a language they don’t speak. They have done an admirable job. And as I’ve said before, the Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these non-traditional capabilities – something the ROTC cadets in this audience can anticipate.

But it is no replacement for the real thing – civilian involvement and expertise.

A few examples are useful here, as microcosms of what our overall government effort should look like – one historical and a few contemporary ones.

However uncomfortable it may be to raise Vietnam all these years later, the history of that conflict is instructive. After first pursuing a strategy based on conventional military firepower, the United States shifted course and began a comprehensive, integrated program of pacification, civic action, and economic development. The CORDS program, as it was known, involved more than a thousand civilian employees from USAID and other organizations, and brought the multiple agencies into a joint effort. It had the effect of, in the words of General Creighton Abrams, putting “all of us on one side and the enemy on the other.” By the time U.S. troops were pulled out, the CORDS program had helped pacify most of the hamlets in South Vietnam.

The importance of deploying civilian expertise has been relearned – the hard way – through the effort to staff Provincial Reconstruction Teams, first in Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq. The PRTs were designed to bring in civilians experienced in agriculture, governance, and other aspects of development – to work with and alongside the military to improve the lives of the local population, a key tenet of any counterinsurgency effort. Where they are on the ground – even in small numbers – we have seen tangible and often dramatic changes. An Army brigade commander in Baghdad recently said that an embedded PRT was “pivotal” in getting Iraqis in his sector to better manage their affairs.

We also have increased our effectiveness by joining with organizations and people outside the government – untapped resources with tremendous potential.

For example, in Afghanistan the military has recently brought in professional anthropologists as advisors. The New York Times reported on the work of one of them, who said, “I’m frequently accused of militarizing anthropology. But we’re really anthropologizing the military.”

And it is having a very real impact. The same story told of a village that had just been cleared of the Taliban. The anthropologist pointed out to the military officers that there were more widows than usual, and that the sons would feel compelled to take care of them – possibly by joining the insurgency, where many of the fighters are paid. So American officers began a job training program for the widows.

Similarly, our land-grant universities have provided valuable expertise on agricultural and other issues. Texas A&M has had faculty on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003. And Kansas State is lending its expertise to help revitalize universities in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, and working to improve the agricultural sector and veterinary care across Afghanistan. These efforts do not go unnoticed by either Afghan citizens or our men and women in uniform.

I have been heartened by the works of individuals and groups like these. But I am concerned that we need even more civilians involved in the effort and that our efforts must be better integrated.

And I remain concerned that we have yet to create any permanent capability or institutions to rapidly create and deploy these kinds of skills in the future. The examples I mentioned have, by and large, been created ad hoc – on the fly in a climate of crisis. As a nation, we need to figure out how to institutionalize programs and relationships such as these. And we need to find more untapped resources – places where it’s not necessarily how much you spend, but how you spend it.

The way to institutionalize these capabilities is probably not to recreate or repopulate institutions of the past such as AID or USIA. On the other hand, just adding more people to existing government departments such as Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, Justice and so on is not a sufficient answer either – even if they were to be more deployable overseas. New institutions are needed for the 21st century, new organizations with a 21st century mind-set.

For example, public relations was invented in the United States, yet we are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals. It is just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the internet than America. As one foreign diplomat asked a couple of years ago, “How has one man in a cave managed to out-communicate the world’s greatest communication society?” Speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come readily to mind when discussing U.S. strategic communications.

Similarly, we need to develop a permanent, sizeable cadre of immediately deployable experts with disparate skills, a need which president bush called for in his 2007 state of the union address, and which the State Department is now working on with its initiative to build a civilian response corps. Both the President and Secretary of State have asked for full funding for this initiative. But we also need new thinking about how to integrate our government’s capabilities in these areas, and then how to integrate government capabilities with those in the private sector, in universities, in other non-governmental organizations, with the capabilities of our allies and friends – and with the nascent capabilities of those we are trying to help.

Which brings me to a fundamental point. Despite the improvements of recent years, despite the potential innovative ideas hold for the future, sometimes there is no substitute for resources – for money.

Funding for non-military foreign-affairs programs has increased since 2001, but it remains disproportionately small relative to what we spend on the military and to the importance of such capabilities. Consider that this year’s budget for the Department of Defense – not counting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan – is nearly half a trillion dollars. The total foreign affairs budget request for the State Department is $36 billion – less than what the Pentagon spends on health care alone. Secretary Rice has asked for a budget increase for the State Department and an expansion of the Foreign Service. The need is real.

Despite new hires, there are only about 6,600 professional Foreign Service officers – less than the manning for one aircraft carrier strike group. And personnel challenges loom on the horizon. By one estimate, 30 percent of USAID’s Foreign Service officers are eligible for retirement this year – valuable experience that cannot be contracted out.

Overall, our current military spending amounts to about 4 percent of GDP, below the historic norm and well below previous wartime periods. Nonetheless, we use this benchmark as a rough floor of how much we should spend on defense. We lack a similar benchmark for other departments and institutions.

What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development. Secretary Rice addressed this need in a speech at Georgetown University nearly two years ago. We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond just our brave soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. We must also focus our energies on the other elements of national power that will be so crucial in the coming years.

Now, I am well aware that having a sitting Secretary of Defense travel halfway across the country to make a pitch to increase the budget of other agencies might fit into the category of “man bites dog” – or for some back in the Pentagon, “blasphemy.” It is certainly not an easy sell politically. And don’t get me wrong, I’ll be asking for yet more money for Defense next year.

Still, I hear all the time from the senior leadership of our Armed Forces about how important these civilian capabilities are. In fact, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen was Chief of Naval Operations, he once said he’d hand a part of his budget to the State Department “in a heartbeat,” assuming it was spent in the right place.

After all, civilian participation is both necessary to making military operations successful and to relieving stress on the men and women of our armed services who have endured so much these last few years, and done so with such unflagging bravery and devotion. Indeed, having robust civilian capabilities available could make it less likely that military force will have to be used in the first place, as local problems might be dealt with before they become crises.

A last point. Repeatedly over the last century Americans averted their eyes in the belief that remote events elsewhere in the world need not engage this country. How could an assassination of an Austrian archduke in unknown Bosnia-Herzegovina effect us? Or the annexation of a little patch of ground called Sudetenland? Or a French defeat at a place called Dien Bien Phu? Or the return of an obscure cleric to Tehran? Or the radicalization of an Arab construction tycoon’s son?

What seems to work best in world affairs, historian Donald Kagan wrote in his book On the Origins of War, “Is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose.”

In an address at Harvard in 1943, Winston Churchill said, “The price of greatness is responsibility . . . The people of the United States cannot escape world responsibility.” And, in a speech at Princeton in 1947, Secretary of State and retired Army general George Marshall told the students: “The development of a sense of responsibility for world order and security, the development of a sense of overwhelming importance of this country’s acts, and failures to act, in relation to world order and security – these, in my opinion, are great musts for your generation.”

Our country has now for many decades taken upon itself great burdens and great responsibilities – all in an effort to defeat despotism in its many forms or to preserve the peace so that other nations, and other peoples, could pursue their dreams. For many decades, the tender shoots of freedom all around the world have been nourished with American blood. Today, across the globe, there are more people than ever seeking economic and political freedom – seeking hope even as oppressive regimes and mass murderers sow chaos in their midst – seeking always to shake free from the bonds of tyranny.

For all of those brave men and women struggling for a better life, there is – and must be – no stronger ally or advocate than the United States of America. Let us never forget that our nation remains a beacon of light for those in dark places. And that our responsibilities to the world – to freedom, to liberty, to the oppressed everywhere – are not a burden on the people or the soul of this nation. They are, rather, a blessing.

I will close with a message for students in the audience. The message is from Theodore Roosevelt, whose words ring as true today as when he delivered them in 1901. He said, “…as, keen-eyed, we gaze into the coming years, duties, new and old, rise thick and fast to confront us from within and from without…[The United States] should face these duties with a sober appreciation alike of their importance and of their difficulty. But there is also every reason for facing them with high-hearted resolution and eager and confident faith in our capacity to do them aright.” He continued, “A great work lies ready to the hand of this generation; it should count itself happy indeed that to it is given the privilege of doing such a work.”

To the young future leaders of America here today, I say, “Come do the great work that lies ready to the hand of your generation.”

Thank you.

lundi 26 novembre 2007

Le défi du partage du renseignement au sein d'une coalition

Partager le renseignement est sûrement une des tâches les plus compliquées d’une coalition. La lourdeur administrative et les règles rigoristes, presque « paranoïaques » de protection du secret aux USA rendent cette tâche difficilement réalisable à grande échelle et avec une réactivité suffisante, (excepté peut-être avec les pays membres d’ « Echelon », et encore…). L’article qui suit rapporte que ce constat est partagé par le général James E. Cartwright (USMC), vice-chairman du « Joint Chiefs of Staff » (JCS). Il souhaite réformer les procédures.

Commentaires :

Ce constat est aussi celui de l’ «
Office of the Secretary of Defense » (OSD-Policy) qui travaille à modifier en profondeur les règles en vigueur. La tâche est ardue car le département de la Défense (DOD) n’est pas le seul «propriétaire » des informations à partager. Dans la « Global War On Terrorism » (GWOT), tout comme dans les initiatives de sécurité internationale telles la « Maritime Defense Awarness » (MDA), ou la « Proliferation Security Initiative », nombreux sont les renseignements qui proviennent d’agences de « Law Enforcement » (LEA) telles le FBI, la DEA, ICE (Les enquêtes douanières), ATF (enquêtes sur les armes, explosifs, alcools et tabac), et autres services de Police qui ont des règles différentes de partage du renseignement, bannissant souvent leur diffusion automatique aux services étrangers pour des raisons légales.
Un pis-aller est la mise en place d'"Intel Fusion Centers" qui récupèrent le renseignement d'origine LEA et l'adapte à la classification du renseignement militaire en lui retirant ce qui peut être jugé sensible par les agences. C'est un processus qui, ne pouvant être automatisé, est gourmand en ressources humaines et en temps.

Le vrai constat est qu’il faut d’abord changer l’état d’esprit. Cette leçon est en partie tirée de l’expérimentation d’un Joint Intelligence Operation Center (JIOC) menée cette année au «
Joint Force Command » (JFCOM) qui a conduit un atelier sur l'intégration des partenaires extérieurs « Allies and Coalition Partners » (ACP) dans un JIOC-X (Experimental Joint Intelligence Operation Center). Y étaient représentés les quatre armées, certains commandements opérationnels (CENTCOM, PACOM, SOCOM, EUCOM, …), des services de renseignement militaires et des partenaires étrangers.

Le concept JIOC vise à créer une synergie plus forte entre le renseignement, la conduite et la planification et travailler en "boucle courte" pour utiliser à temps les données issues du renseignement. L’atelier s’était attaché à faire le point sur les besoins de changement de la réglementation américaine concernant les échanges d'information, les principes devant guider la mise sur pied d'un JIOC avec des partenaires étrangers, ainsi que les besoins en technologie pouvant faciliter le fonctionnement de ce JIOC avec des ACP.

Le concept JIOC est prévu de s'appliquer au niveau opératif. L'idée originelle des Américains était de l'implanter au sein des commandements régionaux. Ce niveau n'ayant pas d'équivalent chez les partenaires à intégrer il a été suggéré de décentraliser les JIOC jusqu'aux Joint Task Forces sur le terrain, là où les ACP déploieront leurs moyens, notamment leurs capteurs.

La principale leçon qui en a été tirée est que les entraves aux échanges étant essentiellement créées par une application rigoriste des règles existantes, changer la loi sans changer l'état d'esprit avec lequel elle est appliquée risque fort d'être une évolution décevante.

C.H.


Vice Chairman Talks Intelligence at Geospatial Conference
American Forces Press Service

By Tech. Sgt. Adam M. Stump, USAF
Special to American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23, 2007 – Intelligence sharing between nations needs to be re-examined and improved, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said here yesterday.
Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright gave the keynote address to more than 2,600 in attendance at the Geospatial Intelligence 2007 Conference. The audience included people from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National
Security Agency, Department of Homeland Security and the Secret Service, along with people from 17 foreign countries.
After his speech, the general took questions from the audience. One question concerned classification being a barrier to international intelligence collaboration.
"If you're a parent, explain this one to your kids: It's OK to share a foxhole with an Aussie, have him die for you, but we can't tell him which way the threat's coming from," Cartwright said. "It's just ludicrous." He said collaborating with other nations while protecting classified information is imperative.
"We have to be able to start to differentiate between what it is we really want to keep secret," the general said.
The challenge of intelligence sharing was recently displayed during a national-level exercise, Cartwright told the audience. American and Australian officials tried to get into each other's computer systems to share intelligence, which proved difficult.
"Not sharing is unacceptable," he bluntly said.
During the question-and-answer session, Cartwright also said developing and expanding a common program to gather intelligence information is important to the future of intelligence capabilities. A current system operates like commercial search engines, he explained.
"The customer decides what it is they want to know,” he said. “It's more akin to My Yahoo! or Google.”
That system has limitations, he said. The way ahead, he told the group, is to let the user tell the search engines what to search for as well as what not to search for. However, Cartwright said, fielding intelligence capabilities shouldn't always involve throwing money at the problem to solve it, likening that challenge to the one posed by improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan and Iraq.
"It's akin to IEDs," the general said. "We can't afford the solution, but we're going to keep trying to spend the money to do it in some technical way instead of stepping out of the architectures and stovepipes," he added, referring to developing an “outside the box” way of solving the problem.

mercredi 21 novembre 2007

Après l'Irak, quel avenir pour les forces armées américaines?

Les campagnes irakiennes et afghanes menées par l'appareil militaire américain ont laissé des traces sur celui-ci. Les ressources humaines, materielles et financières ne sont pas inépuisables.
L'article qui suit, traduit en français, résume bien les défis auxquels doit faire face les Forces Armées des USA dans les années à venir.
L'article original en anglais contient de nombreux liens vers d'autres documents interessants. vous pouvez le trouver à l'adresse:
http://www.cfr.org/publication/14721/future_of_the_us_military.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F13554%2Fgreg_bruno

C.H.


LE FUTUR DES FORCES ARMEES U.S.

Greg Bruno, Staff Writer

CONCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS - 7 Novembre 2007



Introduction

Six ans après le 11 septembre, les forces armées américaines sont à la croisée des chemins. Mises sous pression par le double poids de la guerre en Iraq et en Afghanistan, les ressources humaines et matérielles du Pentagone gravitent à proximité du point de rupture. Les forces terrestres sont particulièrement sous tension. L'US Army (USA), responsable de l'essentiel des opérations au Moyen-Orient, prévoit des déficits en officiers et des pénuries d'équipement alors que les conflits traînent en longueur. L’US Marine Corps (USMC), également, peine à maintenir des niveaux adéquats de préparation aux opérations alors que les pertes en équipements s'accumulent. L'armée de l'air et la marine, moins actifs que leurs homologues des combats au sol, souffrent néanmoins de la plus longue période de conflit depuis le Vietnam. Tous font face à des coupes budgétaires qui risquent de menacer à long terme de leurs capacités.
Beaucoup de choses ont été dites au sujet du « comment » et du « quand » l'armée américaine finira par s’extraire elle-même de ces guerres. Moins d'attention, cependant, a été accordée à ce à quoi l'armée pourrait ressembler à son retour. Les coûts grimpants - à la fois humains et budgétaires - menacent de faire dérailler projets de modernisation des forces que les dirigeants des Forces Armées jugent nécessaires. Et alimenter le débat sur les dépenses nécessaires à la défense fait éclore un désaccord sur la façon dont les menaces contre la nation se manifesteront dans le futur.

US Army (USA)
De l'avis de tous, les composantes d’active et de réserve de l’US Army portent le poids des guerres américaines actuelles. Ainsi en septembre 2007, environ 122.000 soldats de l'Army étaient en Irak, avec un supplément de 18.000 aux côtés de forces de l'OTAN en Afghanistan. Pas moins de 1,4 millions personnels d'active et de réserve ont participé à des opérations de combat depuis le 11 septembre 2001. En avril 2007, le Pentagone a mis en outre plus de contrainte sur l’Army avec l'extension des déploiements à quinze mois au lieu des traditionnels douze. Le mouvement, appelé « Prudent Management » par le Secrétaire à la Défense, M. Robert Gates, est arrivé alors qu’un nombre croissant de soldats ont opté de ne pas se réengager. Pour contrer l'attrition prévue l’US Army prévoit d'ajouter 65000 soldats dans ses rangs en 2010, et de passer le temps entre les déploiements de un an à deux ans. L'armée a également offert des bonifications pour inciter les jeunes officiers à rester sous l’uniforme.
La santé des soldats de retour aussi est en train de devenir une importante préoccupation à long terme. Le « Congressional Budget Office » rapporte que de près de 35000 soldats ont été blessés ou tués dans les combats depuis 2001, et le coût des soins de santé au cours de la prochaine décennie pourrait atteindre 9 milliards de $.
Les problèmes de personnel ne sont pas le seul défi de l'armée, cependant. Le « Center for American Progress » (CAP) et l'Institut Lexington indiquaient en avril 2006 que les contraintes sur les équipements - utilisation intensive et environnement irakien dur - ont réduit l’état de préparation de certaines unités. Le char M1 Abrams, par exemple, est utilisé six fois plus durement qu’en temps de paix, alors que les camions approchent dix fois l'utilisation normale. L'Army estime que 13,5 milliards de $ sont nécessaires pour payer la réparation des équipements essoufflés par la guerre.
Pour faire face à ses défis à long terme, l'Army est en train de rénover sa structure organisationnelle, en créant des équipes "modulaires" de brigades de combat destinées à offrir davantage de flexibilité dans les combats. Mais comme l’explique un documentaire, certains experts se demandent si les réformes ne rendront pas l'armée moins efficace dans les opérations de contre-insurrection.

US Marine Corps (USMC)

Le poids porté par le personnel et le matériel ont aussi accablé l'US Marine Corps. En août 2006 Le « Center for American Progress » (CAP) et de l'Institut Lexington ont signalé que les Marines, à l'instar de l'Army, a trébuché sur une crise des équipements qui menace les futures missions. Près de la moitié des véhicules blindés et de transport de troupes de l’USMC a été déployée en Irak, ont constaté les deux organisations, avec une grande partie endommagée et sur utilisée. Quarante pour cent des équipements de l’USMC pré-positionnés dans des entrepôts en Europe - surtout des véhicules terrestres et des munitions, ont été épuisés, ce qui limite la capacité de l’USMC de réagir à des situations en dehors de l'Iraq.
Certains responsables militaires ont cité les déficits d'équipement comme partie d'une "spirale de la mort" menaçant les réserves stratégiques du Corps; l’estimation des réparations et des remplacements atteignant 17 milliards de $.
Aggravant le sort des Marines, le V - 22 « Osprey », aéronef autour du quel l’USMC a conçu sa doctrine tactique opérationnelle, a été criblé des décennies durant par des problèmes techniques et de sécurité. L’Osprey peut décoller verticalement, puis voler comme un avion conventionnel, mais des défaillances moteur et les restrictions de vol sur ses manœuvres peuvent le rendre beaucoup moins utile dans des situations de combat comme le rapporte le « Times ».
Actuellement, il ya environ 25.000 marines en Irak. À l'instar de l'Army, l’USMC a un plan visant à augmenter en personnel et à réduire le temps entre les déploiements dans les prochaines années. Il n' ya pas de grandes unités de Marines en Afghanistan.

US Navy (USN)

Alors que le rôle de l’US Navy après le 11 septembre a été occulté par l'Army et le Marine Corps, l’Arme maritime de la nation n'a pas été absente de la lutte. Depuis conduite des frappes initiales de missiles de la guerre d’Irak, la marine a participé à la campagne terrestre en apportant le soutien médical et de construction aux unités de Marines; en gardant des centres de détention en Iraq, en envoyant des équipes d'élite de « SEAL » (commandos) contre les terroristes du monde entier. En octobre 2007, un SEAL est devenu le premier membre de la Navy en service en trente ans à gagner la Médaille d'Honneur pour héroïsme au combat. En avril 2007, il y avait dix-sept mille marins en mer en appui des missions en Iraq et en Afghanistan.
Pour accroître sa viabilité à long terme, la Navy est en train de redéfinir ses capacités de combat. Un symbole en est l’appellation « Green-water Navy » attachée à la nouvelle classe de petits bâtiments conçus pour opérer près du littoral, les « Littoral Combat Ships » (LCS). Des dépassements de coûts, cependant, ont conduit à des problèmes.
Plus largement, des plans sont en cours pour élargir les partenariats avec les marines alliées, conduire des missions humanitaires, et protéger les routes maritimes.

US Air Force (USAF)

l'US Air Force fait face à des défis semblables. Depuis 1991 l’USAF a été engagée en patrouillant les zones d'exclusion aérienne en Iraq. Aujourd'hui, elle mène un appui au combat traditionnel et des missions "non traditionnelles" – allant de l’escorte de convoi à la protection des infrastructures. L’USAF est également pris la direction de la guerre cybernétique. Au début de 2007 l’USAF avait trente mille de ses membres déployés dans la région d’US Central Command (USCENTCOM), qui comprend l'Iraq et l'Afghanistan. Pourtant, les guerres ont coûté cher aux aviateurs et à leurs équipements. Selon l’« Air Force Posture Statement » de 2007, un "nombre important" de la force de six mille avions est exploité avec des restrictions de vol en raison de son âge et de la surexploitation. L’âge moyen des bombardiers est plus de trente ans. "En conséquence," conclut l’USAF "l'armée de l'air voit sa capacité de répondre aux exigences de la lutte de demain remise en cause. "
Cette frustration est attestée par ralentissement du développement de nouveaux avions furtifs. Les essais du F-35 « Joint Strike Fighter » (JSF), par exemple, ont été retardés par des dysfonctionnements électriques, et les critiques font valoir que le F-22 « Raptor », un autre avion furtif, est lent et lourd.

L'avenir de la guerre

Tout aussi incertain est le type de conflits dans lesquels le Pentagone sera appelé à se battre. Pour l'instant, l'accent est mis sur les petites guerres, ou soi-disant campagnes de contre-insurrection. Considéré comme la "quatrième génération" de la guerre - derrière la ligne et la colonne, la mitrailleuse et de l'artillerie, le char d’assaut et les avions – ces combats nécessitent un grand nombre de soldats sur le terrain afin d’interagir avec la population et défier une coalition souple de combattants. M. Gates, le Secrétaire d’Etat à la Défense, dit qu'il envisage un avenir où les conflits non conventionnels sont "la pierre angulaire du champ de bataille contemporain."
Néanmoins, certains stratèges militaires affirment que les États-Unis auront besoin d'un vaste éventail de capacités pour contrer les menaces traditionnelles. D'autres encore craignent que le Pentagone ne revienne se concentrer sur la guerre conventionnelle après les guerres en Iraq et en Afghanistan, tout comme elle l'a fait après le Vietnam. L'amiral Michael G. Mullen, chef du Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), a une autre préoccupation. Il s'inquiète la focalisation sur l'Iraq ne conduise le pays à "sombrer dans la complaisance concernant ses responsabilités mondiales qui ne cessent de s’accroitre." Le débat est particulièrement vif au sein de l'Army. R. Gates a déclaré que l'Army devrait améliorer sa capacité à former les armées étrangères, et être prête à reconstruire les infrastructures et relancer les services publics. Cette vision, cependant, est contraire à celle préconisée par l'ancien Secrétaire à la Défense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, qui a appelé à une Army plus petite avec des unités techniques qui évitent clairement les missions d'édification de nations.

Un prix trop élevé

Au-delà des questions d'orientation et de préparation repose une plus grande bataille budgétaire cette fois. Les planificateurs du Pentagone mettent déjà « les chariots en cercle » en vue de la « Quadriennal Defense Review » de 2009 qui servira de cadre pour les dépenses de la prochaine administration présidentielle.

Les planificateurs de l’Army envisagent un monde plein de campagnes de contre-insurrection, où des hommes sur le terrain seraient indispensables. Plus il y a d’hommes, plus grande est la part du budget que l'Army mérite, fait-elle valoir. Les responsables de la Navy et de l’Air Force, en revanche, pourraient espérer un retour à l'ancien ordre mondial de la guerre classique, où les États-nations traditionnels comme la Chine ou la Russie constituent le plus grand risque pour la sécurité. "La grande question pour l'avenir, c'est ce que vous pensez de ce que seront les menaces à long terme", déclare Steven M. Kosiak , un analyste de défense au « Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments », un institut de recherche indépendant. "L'Army ne sera probablement pas particulièrement pertinente si la Chine est votre grande préoccupation."

La base pour le budget du Département de la Défense, actuellement de 483 milliards de $ - presque le double de ce qu'il était au milieu des années 1990 - représente environ 3,9 pour cent du produit intérieur brut américain (PIB), historiquement très bas comparé à des guerres passées, mais les rallonges budgétaires pour les dépenses supplémentaires augmentent les chiffres actuels. Durant le Vietnam, par exemple, les dépenses ont atteint un sommet de 9,5 pour cent du PIB, selon le Pentagone. Mais certains prédisent que les pressions intérieures forceront les politiciens à réduire les dépenses lorsque les conflits actuels s’évanouiront, comme ce fut le cas après la guerre froide. Conscients des querelles budgétaires potentielles, les chefs militaires ont tiré des coups préemptifs. Le secrétaire d’Etat à Air Force, Michael W. Wynne, a déclaré en septembre 2007 que son service aurait besoin d'une tranche additionnelle de 100 milliards de $ au cours des cinq années à venir pour rester apte à répondre aux défis futurs. Pour la Navy, le débat budgétaire peut s'articuler autour de la valeur opérationnelle de cette arme. En Avril 2007 un rapport du »Congressional Research Service » pose au Congrès la question de cette manière: "Les actions de la Navy sont-elles en partie motivés par des préoccupations quant la perception qu’elle est adaptée aux menaces actuelles, ou par un désir d'assurer une partie de son financement ...? "

L'amiral Mullen, lui aussi, a pressé le Congrès de maintenir les niveaux actuels élevé de financement dans les prochaines années. En octobre 2007 il a déclaré à l'International Herald Tribune que les contribuables doivent être prêts à "consacrer plus de ressources à la sécurité nationale", en partie pour la réparation d'équipements et la reconstruction des forces.

Tout le monde n'est pas d'accord. Richard K. Betts, « Senior Fellow » adjoint au « Council on Foreign Relations » dit lui que l’actuel budget de la défense est déjà largement déconnecté de la réalité. "La structure de défense du temps de paix est encore très importante par rapport à la guerre froide", affirme Betts, "et nous n'avons aucune menace comparable à celles qui nous préoccupaient durant la guerre froide."

mardi 20 novembre 2007

Critique des plans militaires: les "Red Teams"

L'article qui suit a été rédigé par une équipe dirigée par le chef d'État-major de la 4ème Division d'Infanterie U.S. déployée en Irak, le Colonel Allen Baschelet. Aiguillonnée par les différents articles critiquant la conduite des opérations par les chefs militaires (voir les billets précédents), l'US Army a vu fleurir un intense débat interne sur l'utilité de la critique, sur son encadrement, et comment la rendre constructive dans la pratique.
Offrant leur expérience actuelle, les auteurs apportent une réponse pratique qu'ils mettent en œuvre en Irak au sein de leur division: Les "Red Teams" . Ce sont des "équipes d'avocats du diable" qui passent au crible les plans militaires avant leur promulgation avec un œil extérieur, en s'appuyant en particulier sur la connaissance de la psychologie et de la culture des adversaires et du milieu .
C.H.

Risking critique

Red Teaming makes open criticism normal in military culture

BY COL. ALLEN BATSCHELET, MAJ. BARRY HAFER AND MAJ. MIKE RUNEY
ARMED FORCES JOURNAL - NOVEMBRE 2007

Openly critiquing one’s boss or his concepts is dicey. Such criticism carries risk and requires wisdom, as well as courage, to successfully transmit a controversial but important message. Challenging an organization’s culture only magnifies the stakes.

In the past few months, a series of retired and active-duty officers have openly criticized the military’s senior leadership. Notably, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling’s critique of the Army’s general officers (“A Failure in Generalship,” May) sparked a professional discussion that is very much alive. In July, Ralph Peters echoed some of Yingling’s argument in a widely published opinion piece. By then, the blogosphere was on fire, but the Internet captured only a fraction of the lively debate that stemmed from both pieces. Much of the discussion, though, has centered on whether the criticism was professional or whether senior leaders are willing to tolerate critical review. Although we do not endorse Yingling’s nor Peters’ arguments per se — the authors of this article each hold differing views on the merits — we emphatically maintain that such professional discourse is vital to the long-term health and credibility of the military profession.

More importantly and near-term, American commanders and military organizations must welcome critical review — by practicing formal and informal Red Teaming: critiquing decisions and bringing alternative perspectives (including non-Western) to the commander and staff in a relevant and timely manner. In the immediate future, mission success hangs in the balance. Longer term, Red Teaming can reshape the American military culture into one that normalizes internal criticism for the betterment of the organization.

For our organization — the Army’s 4th Infantry Division — re-examining modern warfare and urban counterinsurgency is far more than discourse; by December we will be back in Baghdad for the division’s third tour in Iraq in five years. Those who are on the cycle of deploy-reset-redeploy must successfully deal with the challenges of cross-cultural, unconventional, urban warfare in all of its dizzying forms or risk defeat.

We have encapsulated this complex problem set into three challenges: engaging our senior leaders professionally and honestly, integrating cross-cultural dynamics in the staff and command decision cycles, and empowering the staff by changing the culture of thinking among our senior noncommissioned officers, warrant officers and staff officers through critical review.

The first challenge: The division’s senior leaders — today’s general officers and colonels in the field — demand an objective review of their decisions and to have their biases challenged. To increase the effectiveness of such review, the senior leaders decide whom to trust with their thinking, and how and when they are willing to receive honest assessments. Like most people, leaders want people around them with whom they feel comfortable. But warfare is not about comfort, and today’s leaders — especially those going back into the fray — are all too aware of that. Some senior leaders have entrusted selected individuals to challenge and shape their thinking as it develops. That takes guts and involves personal and professional risk.

This need for honest, hard-hitting counsel and reflection is not new, but it is rare for several reasons. Some simply don’t have the moral fiber to either ask for it or give it. Although some argue that the mark of a true professional is one who gives his bosses honest feedback, whether asked or not, the historical reality is such men and women are rare. Culturally, we need a boost of courage.

A near-term solution to producing the objective reviews asked for by the command teams is to establish a framework for intentional but productive disharmony. History demonstrates the need for such free give and take between a leader and his charges. In medieval courts, the jester held an important and appointed role. He was also somewhat immune from the noble’s ire as long as his antics were in the noble’s and the court’s best interests and delivered cleverly.

Today, the need for trusted, timely and constructive review that is also brutally honest is vital to the health of an organization. Who is chartered to intellectually spar with our senior leaders? Minus a jester’s buffoonery, the answer across the joint community has become Red Teams.

These Red Teams serve as the designated critics charged with productively challenging ideas and decisions, bringing fresh perspectives, and ensuring the cultural factors are injected into the decision cycle. Red Teaming as a practice has emerged episodically in Western militaries for more than a century. But only the demands of counterinsurgency operations in an era of global information warfare have made the need so stark, especially among tactical formations in a strategic fishbowl.
BUILDING THE TEAM

The need for a Red Team stemmed from experience, not as a substitute for it. In the case of the 4th Infantry Division, almost every one of its senior leaders has served at least one combat tour in theater. The division’s commanding general covered more than 50,000 miles in the streets of Baghdad on foot and in vehicles. Many on the staff are returning after only a 12-month hiatus.
As the division prepares to resume its former mission, the senior leaders decided early — less than two months after returning from theater — that among the many requirements for redeployment, they wanted a Red Team capability in and among the staff as a physical entity and as a living idea. That small team of three officers is the nucleus charged to bring the division’s senior leaders that critical review and unleash that capability among the staff.

The second challenge: better account for foreign, cross-cultural perspectives in decision-making. Cultural intelligence and aptitude go far beyond the faux pas of showing one’s soles, insensitivity to cross-gender interactions or even holding advanced degrees in humanities. Senior leaders, inundated with the demands of command, are asking how others — our enemies, allies and other parties — will perceive a situation and American actions in the streets of Baghdad. That requires American leaders and staffs to understand worldviews, deep-seated beliefs and the unspoken interests of others. To gain this perspective, the Army is bolstering its staffs and sending many experienced leaders back to theater. For example, brigades are receiving human terrain teams and are partnering with provincial reconstruction teams from the State Department, which began this summer. Our information operations teams, psychological operators and civil affairs leaders are now returning to theater more experienced and more cross-culturally attuned. They understand, ahead of time, how the Iraqi and Middle Eastern audiences will respond to what we say and do, as well as the negative — what we don’t say and do. More importantly, we all better understand the American military is but one actor that wields considerable, but not dominant, power in today’s conflicts. We aim to use that power effectively and judiciously.

The third challenge: Introduce critical review and alternative perspectives into the staff and staff processes and shape our own American military culture from within. Clearly, the addition of a Red Team or something like it introduces new and potentially disruptive dynamics to the staff. To the point, the military’s deliberate decision-making process does not yet explicitly require a critical review, and Army divisions and corps won’t see Red Teams in their organizational tables until 2009 and beyond. Crisis-action planning provides even less margin for re-evaluation.

‘WINNING’ CULTURE WEAKNESS

Changing the professional culture, though, extends beyond staff processes and organizations. Clearly establishing methods and techniques for critical review is the first step to create a new set of expectations. The real challenge, though, is in replacing the military culture’s girders without bringing down the organization. Americans — civilian and military alike — revere “can do” and “make it happen” mind-sets, thereby marginalizing honest and productive criticism. American culture focuses on “winning” and “victory,” sometimes to our own detriment. The sports mind-set prevails: More wins equal the playoffs and a chance to play for the championship. As much as Americans enjoy sports and allusions to them, we must be wary of becoming mired in our own metaphors.

Casting ongoing operations in Iraq as an athletic match can clarify issues to the immediate, American audience. But if taken too far, especially in regard to the Iraq problem sets and warfare in general, sports analogies can limit our thinking unnecessarily and present our operations in a short-term, winner-take-all framework.

In contrast to a sports emphasis toward warfare, our enemies — and even some of our allies — have taken a longer view emphasizing intelligent perseverance. Their framework is generational. Despite facing numerous tactical failures, they continue to learn, grow and test new ideas. Our enemies then re-engage. Although we should adopt our enemies’ persistence and patience, we must reverse the sequence as much as possible: The learning, growing and testing must come first.

To reach that point, as professionals, we must re-examine our individual willingness to have our ideas and work tested before taking action. That combines the best of the American “can do” with other cultures’ perseverance.

Red Teaming as a practice can appear to undermine teamwork and efficiency, both of which are unacceptable costs under tactical pressures and timelines. As a result, many reflexively respond to critical review and alternative perspective by throwing up intellectual and professional defenses. Red Teaming activates a staff’s “antibodies,” especially if trust and rapport have yet to be established by those conducting the critique. Yingling and Peters disregard the staff in their analyses. Arguably, the staff officer culture should be the focus, especially because the military’s next generation of senior leaders is now serving as staff officers. The staff officer, just as much as the commanders, must seek out critical review on his own products and among his own teams.

Just as important, anyone Red Teaming must foster trust by working within tactical timelines to deliver actionable, salient critique to the staff.
Such a shift in American military culture is already occurring. How long it will go and what form it ultimately takes are yet to be seen, but momentum is building among all ranks, including general officers, to re-evaluate how we approach warfare. Acceptance and wide use of critical review will continue when the senior NCO and midgrade officers are on board, not just the senior officers. A few senior officers will lead the charge, but the driven colonels, majors and captains, with the steady hands of forward-thinking and realistic warrant officers, sergeants major and senior battle staff NCOs, will affect the junior officers, NCOs and soldiers in sufficient numbers to carry through the change in culture.

The notion of well-timed, incisive self-critique among staff officers can and should be the ultimate form of teamwork.
The open demand for alternative perspectives and challenges to current thinking is relatively new to the profession; at a minimum, it is new to the current generation in uniform. At the strategic command levels, the recent additions of Red Teams already have proved themselves: They exist at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Army Staff and in some combatant commands. Yet they are new to corps since 2006 and just now are showing up in divisions and brigades.

Three months short of redeploying to Baghdad, the 4th Infantry Division Red Team stood up — with the help of the Texas Army National Guard — not waiting for the new organizational structures to fall in place. Staff integration is ongoing, and all elements of the command and staff have a stake in Red Teaming as a concept: critical review through the lens of alternative perspectives of all their key products and decisions.

The goal is that everyone does “Red Teaming,” not just the Red Team.
It is up to the men and women on Red Teams and all who conduct critical review regularly to earn trust and deliver solid, actionable critiques. They will be most successful when leaders clearly articulate how and when they will receive such frank critique.

Today, Red Teamers and other staff members charged with critical review are in the fray, sweating, eating dust and sometimes bleeding right alongside the soldier, the staff officer and the general. Most often, their struggles are in the meeting, working group or briefing room, focused on making better decisions and orders.

Commanders and staffs in the 4th Infantry Division have bought in to bringing critical review to the battlefield. Although our focus is Baghdad and the foreign culture we encounter there, we are confident the long-term result will also shape the American military profession for the better.


Col. Allen Batschelet is the Army’s 4th Infantry Division’s chief of staff and served as a brigade commander in Baghdad in 2005-06. Maj. Barry Hafer and Maj. Mike Runey serve on the Red Team. All three deployed to Baghdad this fall.

dimanche 18 novembre 2007

L'échec des généraux US en Irak: Il faut réformer leur sélection

Cet article du Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Yingling a secoué l'US Army par sa critique ouverte de ses généraux, qui, à ses yeux, ont été incapables de conduire victorieusement la campagne Irakienne. L'auteur rapproche cette incapacité de celle qui a amené la défaite américaine au Vietnam. Pour Yingling, il faut réformer le mode de sélection des officiers généraux et il avance un certain nombre de pistes.
Le Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Yingling est le second du 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment, a servi deux fois en Irak et détient un Master en Sciences Politiques de l'Université de Chicago.
C.H.


A FAILURE IN GENERALSHIP

By Lt. Col. Paul Yingling
Armed Forces Journal - May 2007

For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq’s grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war.
These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America’s general officer corps. America’s generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America’s generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.

The Responsibilities of Generalship


Armies do not fight wars; nations fight wars. War is not a military activity conducted by soldiers, but rather a social activity that involves entire nations. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted that passion, probability and policy each play their role in war. Any understanding of war that ignores one of these elements is fundamentally flawed.
The passion of the people is necessary to endure the sacrifices inherent in war. Regardless of the system of government, the people supply the blood and treasure required to prosecute war. The statesman must stir these passions to a level commensurate with the popular sacrifices required. When the ends of policy are small, the statesman can prosecute a conflict without asking the public for great sacrifice. Global conflicts such as World War II require the full mobilization of entire societies to provide the men and materiel necessary for the successful prosecution of war. The greatest error the statesman can make is to commit his nation to a great conflict without mobilizing popular passions to a level commensurate with the stakes of the conflict.
Popular passions are necessary for the successful prosecution of war, but cannot be sufficient. To prevail, generals must provide policymakers and the public with a correct estimation of strategic probabilities. The general is responsible for estimating the likelihood of success in applying force to achieve the aims of policy. The general describes both the means necessary for the successful prosecution of war and the ways in which the nation will employ those means. If the policymaker desires ends for which the means he provides are insufficient, the general is responsible for advising the statesman of this incongruence. The statesman must then scale back the ends of policy or mobilize popular passions to provide greater means. If the general remains silent while the statesman commits a nation to war with insufficient means, he shares culpability for the results.
However much it is influenced by passion and probability, war is ultimately an instrument of policy and its conduct is the responsibility of policymakers. War is a social activity undertaken on behalf of the nation; Augustine counsels us that the only purpose of war is to achieve a better peace. The choice of making war to achieve a better peace is inherently a value judgment in which the statesman must decide those interests and beliefs worth killing and dying for. The military man is no better qualified than the common citizen to make such judgments. He must therefore confine his input to his area of expertise — the estimation of strategic probabilities.
The correct estimation of strategic possibilities can be further subdivided into the preparation for war and the conduct of war. Preparation for war consists in the raising, arming, equipping and training of forces. The conduct of war consists of both planning for the use of those forces and directing those forces in operations.
To prepare forces for war, the general must visualize the conditions of future combat. To raise military forces properly, the general must visualize the quality and quantity of forces needed in the next war. To arm and equip military forces properly, the general must visualize the materiel requirements of future engagements. To train military forces properly, the general must visualize the human demands on future battlefields, and replicate those conditions in peacetime exercises. Of course, not even the most skilled general can visualize precisely how future wars will be fought. According to British military historian and soldier Sir Michael Howard, “In structuring and preparing an army for war, you can be clear that you will not get it precisely right, but the important thing is not to be too far wrong, so that you can put it right quickly.”
The most tragic error a general can make is to assume without much reflection that wars of the future will look much like wars of the past. Following World War I, French generals committed this error, assuming that the next war would involve static battles dominated by firepower and fixed fortifications. Throughout the interwar years, French generals raised, equipped, armed and trained the French military to fight the last war. In stark contrast, German generals spent the interwar years attempting to break the stalemate created by firepower and fortifications. They developed a new form of war — the blitzkrieg — that integrated mobility, firepower and decentralized tactics. The German Army did not get this new form of warfare precisely right. After the 1939 conquest of Poland, the German Army undertook a critical self-examination of its operations. However, German generals did not get it too far wrong either, and in less than a year had adapted their tactics for the invasion of France.
After visualizing the conditions of future combat, the general is responsible for explaining to civilian policymakers the demands of future combat and the risks entailed in failing to meet those demands. Civilian policymakers have neither the expertise nor the inclination to think deeply about strategic probabilities in the distant future. Policymakers, especially elected representatives, face powerful incentives to focus on near-term challenges that are of immediate concern to the public. Generating military capability is the labor of decades. If the general waits until the public and its elected representatives are immediately concerned with national security threats before finding his voice, he has waited too long. The general who speaks too loudly of preparing for war while the nation is at peace places at risk his position and status. However, the general who speaks too softly places at risk the security of his country.
Failing to visualize future battlefields represents a lapse in professional competence, but seeing those fields clearly and saying nothing is an even more serious lapse in professional character. Moral courage is often inversely proportional to popularity and this observation in nowhere more true than in the profession of arms. The history of military innovation is littered with the truncated careers of reformers who saw gathering threats clearly and advocated change boldly. A military professional must possess both the physical courage to face the hazards of battle and the moral courage to withstand the barbs of public scorn. On and off the battlefield, courage is the first characteristic of generalship.

Failures of Generalship in Vietnam
America’s defeat in Vietnam is the most egregious failure in the history of American arms. America’s general officer corps refused to prepare the Army to fight unconventional wars, despite ample indications that such preparations were in order. Having failed to prepare for such wars, America’s generals sent our forces into battle without a coherent plan for victory. Unprepared for war and lacking a coherent strategy, America lost the war and the lives of more than 58,000 service members.
Following World War II, there were ample indicators that America’s enemies would turn to insurgency to negate our advantages in firepower and mobility. The French experiences in Indochina and Algeria offered object lessons to Western armies facing unconventional foes. These lessons were not lost on the more astute members of America’s political class. In 1961, President Kennedy warned of “another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by evading and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.” In response to these threats, Kennedy undertook a comprehensive program to prepare America’s armed forces for counterinsurgency.
Despite the experience of their allies and the urging of their president, America’s generals failed to prepare their forces for counterinsurgency. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Decker assured his young president, “Any good soldier can handle guerrillas.” Despite Kennedy’s guidance to the contrary, the Army viewed the conflict in Vietnam in conventional terms. As late as 1964, Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated flatly that “the essence of the problem in Vietnam is military.” While the Army made minor organizational adjustments at the urging of the president, the generals clung to what Andrew Krepinevich has called “the Army concept,” a vision of warfare focused on the destruction of the enemy’s forces.
Having failed to visualize accurately the conditions of combat in Vietnam, America’s generals prosecuted the war in conventional terms. The U.S. military embarked on a graduated attrition strategy intended to compel North Vietnam to accept a negotiated peace. The U.S. undertook modest efforts at innovation in Vietnam. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), spearheaded by the State Department’s “Blowtorch” Bob Kromer, was a serious effort to address the political and economic causes of the insurgency. The Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program (CAP) was an innovative approach to population security. However, these efforts are best described as too little, too late. Innovations such as CORDS and CAP never received the resources necessary to make a large-scale difference. The U.S. military grudgingly accepted these innovations late in the war, after the American public’s commitment to the conflict began to wane.
America’s generals not only failed to develop a strategy for victory in Vietnam, but also remained largely silent while the strategy developed by civilian politicians led to defeat. As H.R. McMaster noted in “Dereliction of Duty,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff were divided by service parochialism and failed to develop a unified and coherent recommendation to the president for prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion. Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson estimated in 1965 that victory would require as many as 700,000 troops for up to five years. Commandant of the Marine Corps Wallace Greene made a similar estimate on troop levels. As President Johnson incrementally escalated the war, neither man made his views known to the president or Congress. President Johnson made a concerted effort to conceal the costs and consequences of Vietnam from the public, but such duplicity required the passive consent of America’s generals.
Having participated in the deception of the American people during the war, the Army chose after the war to deceive itself. In “Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife,” John Nagl argued that instead of learning from defeat, the Army after Vietnam focused its energies on the kind of wars it knew how to win — high-technology conventional wars. An essential contribution to this strategy of denial was the publication of “On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War,” by Col. Harry Summers. Summers, a faculty member of the U.S. Army War College, argued that the Army had erred by not focusing enough on conventional warfare in Vietnam, a lesson the Army was happy to hear. Despite having been recently defeated by an insurgency, the Army slashed training and resources devoted to counterinsurgency.
By the early 1990s, the Army’s focus on conventional war-fighting appeared to have been vindicated. During the 1980s, the U.S. military benefited from the largest peacetime military buildup in the nation’s history. High-technology equipment dramatically increased the mobility and lethality of our ground forces. The Army’s National Training Center honed the Army’s conventional war-fighting skills to a razor’s edge. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled the demise of the Soviet Union and the futility of direct confrontation with the U.S. Despite the fact the U.S. supported insurgencies in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola to hasten the Soviet Union’s demise, the U.S. military gave little thought to counterinsurgency throughout the 1990s. America’s generals assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much like the wars of the past — state-on-state conflicts against conventional forces. America’s swift defeat of the Iraqi Army, the world’s fourth-largest, in 1991 seemed to confirm the wisdom of the U.S. military’s post-Vietnam reforms. But the military learned the wrong lessons from Operation Desert Storm. It continued to prepare for the last war, while its future enemies prepared for a new kind of war.

Failures of Generalship in Iraq
America’s generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq. First, throughout the 1990s our generals failed to envision the conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly. Second, America’s generals failed to estimate correctly both the means and the ways necessary to achieve the aims of policy prior to beginning the war in Iraq. Finally, America’s generals did not provide Congress and the public with an accurate assessment of the conflict in Iraq.
Despite paying lip service to “transformation” throughout the 1990s, America’s armed forces failed to change in significant ways after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In “The Sling and the Stone,” T.X. Hammes argues that the Defense Department’s transformation strategy focuses almost exclusively on high-technology conventional wars. The doctrine, organizations, equipment and training of the U.S. military confirm this observation. The armed forces fought the global war on terrorism for the first five years with a counterinsurgency doctrine last revised in the Reagan administration. Despite engaging in numerous stability operations throughout the 1990s, the armed forces did little to bolster their capabilities for civic reconstruction and security force development. Procurement priorities during the 1990s followed the Cold War model, with significant funding devoted to new fighter aircraft and artillery systems. The most commonly used tactical scenarios in both schools and training centers replicated high-intensity interstate conflict. At the dawn of the 21st century, the U.S. is fighting brutal, adaptive insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, while our armed forces have spent the preceding decade having done little to prepare for such conflicts.
Having spent a decade preparing to fight the wrong war, America’s generals then miscalculated both the means and ways necessary to succeed in Iraq. The most fundamental military miscalculation in Iraq has been the failure to commit sufficient forces to provide security to Iraq’s population. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated in its 1998 war plan that 380,000 troops would be necessary for an invasion of Iraq. Using operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as a model for predicting troop requirements, one Army study estimated a need for 470,000 troops. Alone among America’s generals, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki publicly stated that “several hundred thousand soldiers” would be necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. Prior to the war, President Bush promised to give field commanders everything necessary for victory. Privately, many senior general officers both active and retired expressed serious misgivings about the insufficiency of forces for Iraq. These leaders would later express their concerns in tell-all books such as “Fiasco” and “Cobra II.” However, when the U.S. went to war in Iraq with less than half the strength required to win, these leaders did not make their objections public.
Given the lack of troop strength, not even the most brilliant general could have devised the ways necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. However, inept planning for postwar Iraq took the crisis caused by a lack of troops and quickly transformed it into a debacle. In 1997, the U.S. Central Command exercise “Desert Crossing” demonstrated that many postwar stabilization tasks would fall to the military. The other branches of the U.S. government lacked sufficient capability to do such work on the scale required in Iraq. Despite these results, CENTCOM accepted the assumption that the State Department would administer postwar Iraq. The military never explained to the president the magnitude of the challenges inherent in stabilizing postwar Iraq.
After failing to visualize the conditions of combat in Iraq, America’s generals failed to adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency.
Counterinsurgency theory prescribes providing continuous security to the population. However, for most of the war American forces in Iraq have been concentrated on large forward-operating bases, isolated from the Iraqi people and focused on capturing or killing insurgents. Counterinsurgency theory requires strengthening the capability of host-nation institutions to provide security and other essential services to the population. America’s generals treated efforts to create transition teams to develop local security forces and provincial reconstruction teams to improve essential services as afterthoughts, never providing the quantity or quality of personnel necessary for success.
After going into Iraq with too few troops and no coherent plan for postwar stabilization, America’s general officer corps did not accurately portray the intensity of the insurgency to the American public. The Iraq Study Group concluded that “there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq.” The ISG noted that “on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.” Population security is the most important measure of effectiveness in counterinsurgency. For more than three years, America’s generals continued to insist that the U.S. was making progress in Iraq. However, for Iraqi civilians, each year from 2003 onward was more deadly than the one preceding it. For reasons that are not yet clear, America’s general officer corps underestimated the strength of the enemy, overestimated the capabilities of Iraq’s government and security forces and failed to provide Congress with an accurate assessment of security conditions in Iraq. Moreover, America’s generals have not explained clearly the larger strategic risks of committing so large a portion of the nation’s deployable land power to a single theater of operations.
The intellectual and moral failures common to America’s general officer corps in Vietnam and Iraq constitute a crisis in American generalship. Any explanation that fixes culpability on individuals is insufficient. No one leader, civilian or military, caused failure in Vietnam or Iraq. Different military and civilian leaders in the two conflicts produced similar results. In both conflicts, the general officer corps designed to advise policymakers, prepare forces and conduct operations failed to perform its intended functions. To understand how the U.S. could face defeat at the hands of a weaker insurgent enemy for the second time in a generation, we must look at the structural influences that produce our general officer corps.

The Generals We Need
The most insightful examination of failed generalship comes from J.F.C. Fuller’s “Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure.” Fuller was a British major general who saw action in the first attempts at armored warfare in World War I. He found three common characteristics in great generals — courage, creative intelligence and physical fitness.
The need for intelligent, creative and courageous general officers is self-evident. An understanding of the larger aspects of war is essential to great generalship. However, a survey of Army three- and four-star generals shows that only 25 percent hold advanced degrees from civilian institutions in the social sciences or humanities. Counterinsurgency theory holds that proficiency in foreign languages is essential to success, yet only one in four of the Army’s senior generals speaks another language. While the physical courage of America’s generals is not in doubt, there is less certainty regarding their moral courage. In almost surreal language, professional military men blame their recent lack of candor on the intimidating management style of their civilian masters. Now that the public is immediately concerned with the crisis in Iraq, some of our generals are finding their voices. They may have waited too long.
Neither the executive branch nor the services themselves are likely to remedy the shortcomings in America’s general officer corps. Indeed, the tendency of the executive branch to seek out mild-mannered team players to serve as senior generals is part of the problem. The services themselves are equally to blame. The system that produces our generals does little to reward creativity and moral courage. Officers rise to flag rank by following remarkably similar career patterns. Senior generals, both active and retired, are the most important figures in determining an officer’s potential for flag rank. The views of subordinates and peers play no role in an officer’s advancement; to move up he must only please his superiors. In a system in which senior officers select for promotion those like themselves, there are powerful incentives for conformity. It is unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late forties.
If America desires creative intelligence and moral courage in its general officer corps, it must create a system that rewards these qualities. Congress can create such incentives by exercising its proper oversight function in three areas. First, Congress must change the system for selecting general officers. Second, oversight committees must apply increased scrutiny over generating the necessary means and pursuing appropriate ways for applying America’s military power. Third, the Senate must hold accountable through its confirmation powers those officers who fail to achieve the aims of policy at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure.
To improve the creative intelligence of our generals, Congress must change the officer promotion system in ways that reward adaptation and intellectual achievement. Congress should require the armed services to implement 360-degree evaluations for field-grade and flag officers. Junior officers and noncommissioned officers are often the first to adapt because they bear the brunt of failed tactics most directly. They are also less wed to organizational norms and less influenced by organizational taboos. Junior leaders have valuable insights regarding the effectiveness of their leaders, but the current promotion system excludes these judgments. Incorporating subordinate and peer reviews into promotion decisions for senior leaders would produce officers more willing to adapt to changing circumstances, and less likely to conform to outmoded practices.
Congress should also modify the officer promotion system in ways that reward intellectual achievement. The Senate should examine the education and professional writing of nominees for three- and four-star billets as part of the confirmation process. The Senate would never confirm to the Supreme Court a nominee who had neither been to law school nor written legal opinions. However, it routinely confirms four-star generals who possess neither graduate education in the social sciences or humanities nor the capability to speak a foreign language. Senior general officers must have a vision of what future conflicts will look like and what capabilities the U.S. requires to prevail in those conflicts. They must possess the capability to understand and interact with foreign cultures. A solid record of intellectual achievement and fluency in foreign languages are effective indicators of an officer’s potential for senior leadership.
To reward moral courage in our general officers, Congress must ask hard questions about the means and ways for war as part of its oversight responsibility. Some of the answers will be shocking, which is perhaps why Congress has not asked and the generals have not told. Congress must ask for a candid assessment of the money and manpower required over the next generation to prevail in the Long War. The money required to prevail may place fiscal constraints on popular domestic priorities. The quantity and quality of manpower required may call into question the viability of the all-volunteer military. Congress must re-examine the allocation of existing resources, and demand that procurement priorities reflect the most likely threats we will face. Congress must be equally rigorous in ensuring that the ways of war contribute to conflict termination consistent with the aims of national policy. If our operations produce more enemies than they defeat, no amount of force is sufficient to prevail. Current oversight efforts have proved inadequate, allowing the executive branch, the services and lobbyists to present information that is sometimes incomplete, inaccurate or self-serving. Exercising adequate oversight will require members of Congress to develop the expertise necessary to ask the right questions and display the courage to follow the truth wherever it leads them.
Finally, Congress must enhance accountability by exercising its little-used authority to confirm the retired rank of general officers. By law, Congress must confirm an officer who retires at three- or four-star rank. In the past this requirement has been pro forma in all but a few cases. A general who presides over a massive human rights scandal or a substantial deterioration in security ought to be retired at a lower rank than one who serves with distinction. A general who fails to provide Congress with an accurate and candid assessment of strategic probabilities ought to suffer the same penalty. As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war. By exercising its powers to confirm the retired ranks of general officers, Congress can restore accountability among senior military leaders.

Mortal Danger
This article began with Frederick the Great’s admonition to his officers to focus their energies on the larger aspects of war. The Prussian monarch’s innovations had made his army the terror of Europe, but he knew that his adversaries were learning and adapting. Frederick feared that his generals would master his system of war without thinking deeply about the ever-changing nature of war, and in doing so would place Prussia’s security at risk. These fears would prove prophetic. At the Battle of Valmy in 1792, Frederick’s successors were checked by France’s ragtag citizen army. In the fourteen years that followed, Prussia’s generals assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much like those of the past. In 1806, the Prussian Army marched lockstep into defeat and disaster at the hands of Napoleon at Jena. Frederick’s prophecy had come to pass; Prussia became a French vassal.
Iraq is America’s Valmy. America’s generals have been checked by a form of war that they did not prepare for and do not understand. They spent the years following the 1991 Gulf War mastering a system of war without thinking deeply about the ever changing nature of war. They marched into Iraq having assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much like the wars of the past. Those few who saw clearly our vulnerability to insurgent tactics said and did little to prepare for these dangers. As at Valmy, this one debacle, however humiliating, will not in itself signal national disaster. The hour is late, but not too late to prepare for the challenges of the Long War. We still have time to select as our generals those who possess the intelligence to visualize future conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the preparations needed for our security. The power and the responsibility to identify such generals lie with the U.S. Congress. If Congress does not act, our Jena awaits us.